If God condemned people to Hell because of free will, yet He wanted to save them, would that mean He isn't capable of saving them?

Christian View

The Christian Perspective

If "free will" means that the activities of the human will are not in any way caused by the God who created the humans, then humans do not have free will.

The idea of a God who causes people to exist, which people then in turn cause events to occur, and said events are not in any way caused by the aforementioned God, is completely incoherent. I cannot answer the question, because as I understand it, it is meaningless.

However, the Christian God has offered all humans, His created people, forgiveness for our disobedience through the sacrifice of His Son, Jesus (John 14:6; Hebrews 10:14). If we place our trust in the Lord Jesus, we will be forgiven (Romans 3:23, 6:23, 10:13).

Comments

Tim - if a reprobate were to place his trust in the Lord Jesus, will he be forgiven his sins? Will he then be saved? And will he then avoid hell?

— Tony

hey Tony, about what your saying, if a person was reprobate that means God made them in such a way that they reject Him. That's what it means. But the elect are people who are made in such a way that they trust God. So a reprobate who trusts God is like a married bachelor -- doesn't exist! Thanks for bringing that up man!

— Jon

Jon, the question was for Tim. Why don't you leave the adults to talk and go back to the kiddie's table, there's a good boy.

— Tony

yeah, Tony you don't need to feel bad if you don't understand the whole reprobate thing. it was tough for me at first too but you'll get it eventually! keep up the good work man!

— Jon

I'd forgotten how futile it is to try to discuss things in a sensible way with people who are brainwashed, so thanks for reminding me man!

— Tony

"If God condemned people to Hell because of free will, yet He wanted to save them, would that mean He isn't capable of saving them"
1) God has created humans with free will, the ability to choose between responding to His offer of, and calling to, reconciliation or rejecting Him with a resulting permanent estrangement.
2) It is Gods will that all men be reconciled to Him through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.
3) God allows humans to thwart His desire. He doesn't have to, after all He is Soverign and He could force people, but, He, in His soverignity, does.

— Chad

Chad, according to Tim, god has apparently created the elect and the reprobate who are predestined by god to either salvation or eternal damnation and torture in hell. Those who have been predestined to be reprobate can do nothing about this. So god's so-called "offer" of "grace" is utterly meaningless since god has made sure that only some can accept it.

— Tony

Answer me this if you can - what is the moral difference between Tim's god's apparent creation of "reprobates", and tying up a starving person so that she can't move, covering up her mouth, offering her food and then blaming her and puishing her for not "accepting" the food?

— Tony

I've made this point to Tim before but he chose not to answer, because no matter what way you look at it, Tim's god is an evil barbarian and therefore even if he did exist (which he doesn't) the only people who could deem such a being worthy of worship and praise are the truly, deeply brainwashed.

— Tony

Tony, you fail to distinguish between moral inability and natural inability. And you make the assumption that we must have free will to be held responsible. But Jonathan Edwards refuted this argument in his brilliant book the Freedom Of The Will. I am not a Christian and I have never been a Calvinist so you cannot say I am brainwashed. I just read his book and was awed at his brilliant argument. First for the natural vs moral inability issue, to illustrate using an example from Edwards book, imagine 2 people who have severely broken the law and have been justly locked in a jail. The king offers them both mercy if they will only kneel at his throne and beg his forgiveness and he will pardon them and give them much riches. The first is very much willing to do so but is prevented by the lock on his door. The 2nd however has the door wide open and is invited to do so, but he cannot because he by nature is horrendously ungrateful and hates his rightful king and can't repent. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

(Continued.) Do you think that those situations are equivalent? Is that the intuitive conclusion you have? I would argue that we naturally blame and praise people based on their character and motives, not their "free will." To illustrate this I will show what we should expect if we naturally attacked praise and blame because of free will. Free Will means that we are able to behave otherwise and that what we choose is within our ultimate control. Free Will cannot be forced by our strongest motive/desire. Otherwise the will could not do otherwise. But the stronger the desire the harder it is to resist. So by this logic the stronger the desire the less free we are and more relevant the less accountable we are for acting upon it. Especially if the competing desires are weak. As it is naturally supposed that the natural inability to do something excuses you completely, and the natural difficult excuses in part, so the same reasoning must be applied to moral inability. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

Sam,
First off, let's be clear that I'm discussing Tim's views only. In that context, the distinction between "moral" and "natural" inability is irrelevant vis a vis Tim's position, and neither of your prisoner/king scenarios fully accurately captures his conception of the relationship between man and god. Remember that Tim's view is that we have no free will. Whatever we do, we do because god has "...crafted, designed and programmed" us to do it.

— Tony

Also, in Tim's worldview there is no sense in which god can be said to have just "permitted" something to happen. If X happens, that's because god caused it to happen. If god were to punish me for doing what he "...crafted, designed and programmed" me to do, Tim would have no problem with that. I, on the other hand, think that that is manifestly unjust. That is my point. Would you agree?

— Tony

I am not a believer in free will myself. If I understand your objection correctly, it can be separated into two. 1. How is it fair to blame someone for doing something they cannot help but do, given their circumstances, desires, character, beliefs, etc. 2. Is it fair for God to make people into "objects of wrath" made for the purpose of going to Hell? I am addressing the first question at this point. I shall deal with the second in a bit. Now I shall give some practical examples to illustrate how contrary to common sense this the idea I mentioned in the above comment is. Some are mine and some are Edward's. The 1st concerns 2 soldiers in the same circumstances, both in this thought experiment have free will to resist their stronger motive. In one case the soldier has been raised to love his country and protect his friend and cares more about these goals then his own life and therefore dies for their sake. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

(Continued.) The 2nd soldier has been raised in a way that makes him care little about his country and comrades and in fact cares far more about his own life but out of his own free will resisted his stronger impulse. Which one is more praiseworthy? On the hypothesis that responsibility is based on free will we should say the first soldier is less praiseworthy as he was highly influenced to do so by the moral motive. The other soldier cared very little and went with the weaker impulse. So the 2nd is more praiseworthy If moral and natural inability are equivalent. A 2nd example (Edwards) is rather extreme-a son who wishes to murder his father. If the son wants to do it as much as not, then he is better of in terms of praise and blame then if he wants to but has a much stronger desire not to. I'll leave it to you to judge if that fits with common sense or not. As for me I think the real basis for moral responsibility is based on motive and character. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

The determinist (as well as consistent indeterminists who realize that uncaused causes are by definition not caused by you and therefore not under your control, direction, planning, etc.) just cuts free will out of the equation completely and I would argue that moral responsibility is better of without it. If this reasoning has fulfilled it's intended purpose then it is absolutely fair to blame someone who has no free will. And there it is fair for God to blame us for something he made us do, although I have not yet established that it is ok for him to make us do it. The reason I view it as ok is that if God exists (I believe in God, but that isn't the subject) then he would be vastly superior to humans. The superiority of God as compared to humans would be so great that it vastly dwarfs the superiority of humans over ants. This is because God would presumably have far more innate dignity then a person . So his desires would vastly outweigh our comfort. (Continued?)

— Sam Burke

Also if you read Romans 9:22-23 one sees that the reasons God sends people to Hell according to the Bible is to "show his wrath and make his power known" to the "objects of his mercy whom he prepared in advance for glory." If God displaying his justice/wrath to his elect is an inherently good thing that outweighs the comfort of the reprobate then I think the issue is answered. Similarly the elect will have his mercy displayed then the redemption and forgiveness that is displayed shall be more than sufficient to outweigh the intrinsic evil of the sin of the elect. And more sin= more justice of mercy and the differing degrees in individual offers God the ability to display creativity. So while I am not a Calvinist I think it is a coherent worldview and I think one that is defensible. I may not like a lot of it it emotionally, but I respect it and I certainly respect Jonathan Edwards who was clearly a genius. I believe I have answered your questions.

— Sam Burke

Sam, you haven't quite grasped it yet and your "soldier" examples are irrelevant.

Your 1st question asks...

"How is it fair to blame someone for doing something they cannot help but do, given their circumstances, desires, character, beliefs etc?"

Not quite. The question is, who is responsible for our "...circumstances, desires, character, beliefs etc", and our "...motive and character" which you claim are the "...real basis for moral responsibility"?

Do we create these ourselves? Are they a result of chance? Absolutely not. In Tim's view, god has "...crafted, designed and programmed" us and our "...circumstances, desires, character, belief etc". In fact, "...the biblical god is in complete control of everything" and "...god causes whatever happens"...including people sinning. Tim states that "...god certainly causes people to sin". In Tim's view, we are just automata, incapable of doing otherwise than what god has "...crafted, designed and programmed us&

— Tony

To sum up - nothing happens by "accident" in Tim's universe. God is in complete control of everything. Ergo nothing happens unless and until god causes it to happen.

Ergo god causes us to sin. He also causes us not to sin. He also caused me to get up just now and make a cup of tea. There is no way, in Tim's view, that humans can do anything other than what god has "...crafted, designed and programmed" them to do. Ergo humans bear no responsibility and cannot be blamed for their actions because they can do nought but follow their programming as laid down by god.

Next question - "Is it fair for god to make people into "objects of wrath" made for the purpose of going to hell?"

Not only is it not fair, it is also absurd and incoherent for god to be wrathful about *anything* that happens, since he causes everything to happen and is in complete control of everything.

— Tony

My soldier examples are far from irrelevant. The point is that free will is not the basis for moral responsibility. As for the issue of God being ultimately responsible for all things including human nature that is absolutely correct on his view. But it is a non sequitur to say that this robs us of our responsibility. To illustrate this, parents may raise children in a way that causes them to have ungrateful, selfish and spoiled characters. The children are responsible for how their character causes them to act (as responsibility is not based upon free will) and the parents are responsible for raising them that way, as they have made their children into had people and are responsible for the harming society by carelessly raising immoral children. The question for God is whether or not he is justified in making us do evil and I have written several arguments above with which you have yet to engage. For your final point, authors can be angry with characters they invent. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

Authors cause their (imaginary) characters to act in certain ways in books. Some of them are bad, but the characters are just fulfilling the authors purposes, so why should the author be angry at a character for doing that? The reason is because the had characters are made for the purpose of being the "bad guy." And their actions invoke anger or dislike in both the author and the audience. Obviously the characters are fictitious, but the author causes everything that happens in the story and is in complete control of the entire story. So the point is that we humans do exactly what you say is self contradictory. So why couldn't God do it?

— Sam Burke

Just so we can try to move this conversation along meaningfully. would you please tell me - if free will is not the basis for moral responsibility...what is?

— Tony

As I see it the basis for moral responsibility is the persons character and motives as well as what they know about the situation. The examples above show that we care about the persons motives and character and if free will was really the basis for moral responsibility we should expect that the more a person is inclined to do an evil or good deed the less accountable they are. This is because our inclinations influence our choices to at least some degree and the stronger they are the harder to resist.

— Sam Burke

Sam, thanks for that. I'll respond in respect of Tim's deterministic worldview.

You said, "As I see it the basis for moral responsibility is the persons character and motives as well as what they know about a situation".

In Tim's universe, god decides what a person's character and motives are and what they know about a situation. Tim says that we are "...crafted, designed and programmed by god". Tim also says that we cannot possibly know anything other than what god reveals to us or programs us to believe. A person cannot escape the way she has been programmed by god nor can she know or find out any more abut a situation than what god permits her to know.

So god specifically crafts, designs and programs what you claim is the basis for moral responsibility i.e. a person's character and motives and what they know about a situation (cont.)

— Tony

"...if free will was really the basis for moral responsibility we should expect that the more a person is inclined to do an evil or good deed the less accountable they are".

Exactly. In Tim's universe, god specifically programs us to be more or less inclined to do evil or good (Tim is particularly fond of Romans 9:18 to illustrate that point). Ergo in Tim's universe we are not accountable for our inclinations towards good or evil because these have been programmed into us by god.

As I said before, in Tim's universe we are merely automata. God "...is in complete control of everything" and he "...causes whatever happens". There is not even, as Tim has erroneously claimed, any such thing as "accidental" sin. There may be sin that man is not aware he has committed but god still caused it because god "...is in complete control of everything, he "...causes whatever happens" and nothing happens unless and until god causes it to be so (cont.)

— Tony

Given that, let me illustrate how nonsensical it would be for god to be wrathful about anything at all...ever. Let's say I pick up a hammer and deliberately, wilfully, consciously, and with full knowledge of the consequences, smash my big toe with it.
Would it not be absurd for me to be angry with the hammer? Would it not be absurd for me to "blame" the hammer and punish it for the damage done to my toe? The hammer didn't "choose" to smash my toe. The hammer is an inanimate object and can do nothing unless and until I cause it to.

In Tim's universe, that's all we are - inanimate objects. We are not "agents". In fact, there is only one "agent" in Tim's universe - god. As Craig said, in the deterministic universe we "...are mere instruments by means of which god acts to produce some effect, much like man using a stick to move a stone".

— Tony

Did the hammer intentionally smash your toe knowing it was wrong? And was that intention and motive the primary direct cause of the toe being smashed?-If the hammer had better intentions would it have not smashed it given the same knowledge? A hammer is not concious, does not have intentions, does not know that is wrong, ect. We on the other hand have all of those things in Tim's worldview. You stated that you agree that the more inclined we are to do a good or bad deed the less praise and blameworthy we are. I have given multiple examples of what this entails above. Do you affirm that the more a soldier cares about his country the less praiseworthy he is for bravely dying for it? (As the more he cares about his country the more influenced he is to die for it. Even if we assume that we have free will it is a self evident fact that the stronger the motive the more likely we are to obey it.) You say that a person cannot escape having the motives, knowledge, character, ect. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

On Tim's worldview. This is correct. God gives all people people the moral inability to fully obey his commands. (I assume the degree of moral inability varies from person to person in his view.) If someone knows that something is wrong and they do it knowing that they could do the right thing IF THEY WANTED TO. (Emphasis added) If someone knows that they should seem more knowledge about a topic and knows how to they are responsible for not doing so because they did not intend to do and and they did not do it knowing that they should have. That is how I see it.

— Sam Burke

"Did the hammer intentionally smash your toe knowing it was wrong?"

No. You're missing the point. The hammer has no intentions or volition, and in Tim's universe, nor do we. To paraphrase Tim, "...the activities of the human will are...caused by god who created...humans" and our wills have been "...crafted, designed and programmed" by him.

Tim says that his god is "...the cause of everything that happens" and he is "...in complete control of everything".

Tim says that "The idea of a god who causes people to exist, which people then in turn cause events to occur, and said events are not in any way caused by the aforementioned god, is completely incoherent".

Ergo, in Tim's universe, humans do not, in any meaningful sense, cause events - we are merely the means by which events are caused (cont)

— Tony

In other words, we do only what god causes us to do. We think only what god causes us to think. We say only what god causes us to say. We have no volition, no motivation, no intentions. We cannot do anything independently or autonomously. We do what god has programmed us to do. End of.

"A hammer is not conscious, does not have intention, does not know what is wrong etc. We on the other hand have all those things in Tim's worldview"

No, we don't. In Tim's universe, a human may indeed have the property of consciousness, but only (to use Craig's analogy) in the same way that a stick has properties that make it suitable for a person who wants to use it to do something like move a stone.

A person in Tim's universe cannot
independently and autonomously decide for herself what is right or wrong, or autonomously decide to do anything, or have intentions other than those which have been programmed into her by god.

— Tony

"God gives all people...the moral inability to fully obey his commands".

No. In Tim's worldview, god does not simply "give" people certain properties and abilities and let them free to run about doing whatever they like in his universe. Remember, Tim's god causes all that happens and is in complete control of everything, and Tim specifically says that his god causes people to sin, even accidentally.

"If someone knows that something is wrong and they do it knowing that they could do the right thing IF THEY WANTED TO..."

Again, no. In Tim's universe, a person will do what god causes her to do, and think what god causes her to think, and want what god causes her to want. She has no control over this and it is therefore absurd, unjust, and incoherent for her to be held accountable for it.

— Tony

"If someone knows she should seek more knowledge about a topic and knows how to..."

This is absurd. How would someone, in Tim's universe, know if she should seek more knowledge on a topic? What she knows, thinks, says and does is caused and determined by god. She has no volition to decide anything. More to the point, what other possible source of knowledge could there be in Tim's universe? Tim says that is it not possible to know anything other than what god has revealed to us or programmed us to believe. Tim says that god "...ordains the means (evidence and thought processes) as well as the ends (our conclusions)". So god causes, determines and decides what we think, how we think, and the conclusions that we come to.

Yet still, somehow, absurdly, we get punished for it.

— Tony

Tony -- how does it follow that if God causes someone to know she should seek more knowledge about a topic, that she cannot know that she should seek more knowledge about that topic? How does it follow that if God causes her to have volition, then she has no volition? How does it follow that if God gives someone intention, then they have no intention?

On the other hand, it does seem to follow that if there is NO cause for an intention, then that intention CANNOT begin to exist, even in Craig's view. I think you are presupposing that a LACK of cause is necessary for certain things to begin to exist, but I don't think there can be any justification for that assumption. Certainly we've never observed it to be the case.

— 2x

2x - please address yourself to what I actually wrote rather than a misrepresentation of it.

I said that in Tim's universe, a person cannot, independently, autonomously, of her own free will, uncaused by god, decide that she needs to know more about a topic. That's because she doesn't have any free will and because nothing happens unless god causes it to happen. If, and only if, god causes something to happen will that thing happen. Having said that, a person will only know, and can ever only know, what god decides, determines and ordains she know, because, according to Tim, god "...ordains the means (evidence and thought processes) as well as the ends (our conclusions)" (cont.)

— Tony

I never said that "...if god gives someone intention, then they have no intention". In Tim's universe, we have no intentions, desire, motivation, wants, volition etc etc outside of an independently of those which god causes us to have.
God, in Tim's universe, does of course cause people to have volition, intentions, motivations, wants, desires etc.

But what god absolutely does NOT do, in Tim's universe, is give people desires, motivations, intentions, etc and then leave them to freely gallivant around his universe, doing things outside his control and doing things which he did not cause.

— Tony

Yeah, Tony. He doesn't cause people to do things that He didn't cause them to do. Of course. But why is that a problem? The Big Bang didn't cause what it didn't cause either.

Sounds to me like you agree with Sam even though you said you didn't: "A hammer is not conscious, does not have intention, does not know what is wrong etc. We on the other hand have all those things in Tim's worldview."

— 2x

Sounds to me like you've taken a leaf out of Tim's playbook - if you don't have a cogent point, just make up some stuff and talk about that instead. Fine, go ahead, I can't stop you - don't expect me to participate though.

— Tony

Whatever.

— 2x

Tony, no one can autonomously self cause their own desires or intentions. This is logically impossible regardless of whether or not God exists. However it does not follow that we don't have intentions just because they were caused by something outside of your control. Yes under Tim's worldview God uses us to cause events, I see no reason why our thoughts and desires cannot be among those causes that God uses. About the knowledge thing, God could cause someone to be aware that they should seek more knowledge about a topic and make them morally unable to seek it. As I have argued above, people are still accountable for things they are morally unable to do. Finally to clarify the point about the ability to obey God's laws, we do obey some of them. For example I do not murder people. Of course I am morally unable to murder as I abhor it. Yes people do what they like (As Tim has said multiple times) but in his view God causes them to like what they like and obey the strongest motive.

— Sam Burke

Just to quote a few times Tim has stated that people can do what they want: "If God had given us free will (the ability to choose or do otherwise), we would then be able to choose to do other then what we prefer to do. However if we are choosing other then what we prefer, then we are choosing to do something against our will. That would be self contradictory-to will to do something that you did not will to do... On the other hand if we define free will differently, namely, the ability to do as we like then Free Will is a concept that actually makes sense and it is something that God has indeed given to man."
("Couldn't God have given us free will without giving us the desire to sin?")
"Free Will has been defined in several different ways. Some would say that free will is defined as "the ability to do what we want to do." Under this definition it's clear that we do have free will as all of us (at least on occasion) do what we want." ("Do we have free will? Please explain.")

— Sam Burke

It appears that I have misunderstood your point about intentions. You state that God has given us intentions in Tim's view, but that God predestined us to have them and we had no ability to not have them. Now we are getting to the center of the disagreement. I have argued above that free will is not the basis of responsibility because if it was then the stronger our motive to do good or bad then the less praise or blameworthy we are as the stronger the motive the less ability we have to resist it. Which would mean less freedom and therefore less responsibility. And it means that the more indifferent we are to a good or bad deed the more responsible we are. So to use another example from Edwards, the more a person is inclined to treat his neighbors horribly the less they should be angry at him. (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

"But how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions? Which is, that they are actions which proceed from a heart well disposed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fixed and determined the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue, and so the more of the truth and reality of it. But if there be any acts which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart; and consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in 'em, having no virtue of heart in 'em. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it."
-Jonathan Edwards.

— Sam Burke

Sam,

You're so close to seeing the essential absurdity of Tim's worldview.

You said "...people do what they like (as Tim has said multiple time) but in his view god causes them to like what they like and obey the strongest motive".

EXACTLY. God causes EVERYTHING. He causes us to like what we like and dislike what we dislike. He causes us to do what we do, say what we say, and think what we think.

In Tim's universe, a person is "...just a lump of clay, animated entirely by your own creator".

Let's be totally clear about something.

Tim absolutely does NOT believe that we have free will in any meaningful way. In the question "Do we have free will? Please explain" Tim says...

"...the issue is not "Can we choose?"...the issue is "are the choices we make predetermined?", or "do we necessarily choose what we choose?" or "was it really possible for us to have chosen otherwise?"(cont.)

— Tony

Tim's answers to these questions are "Yes", "Yes" and "No" respectively and therefore the answer to the question "Can we choose?" has to be "No".

In Tim's universe, the words "choice" and "choose" are meaningless and when Tim uses them, it's so much smoke and mirrors. There is no difference between god causing someone to "choose" to do X, and god causing someone to do X. For Tim, the very idea of choice is an illusion. For Tim, "...the idea of autonomous (or self-governing and independent) human freedom" is "absurd".

Ergo a person can't be praised/blamed for having "chosen" what god caused them to "choose".

Adapting your example from Edwards, the more a person is inclined to treat his neighbours horribly, the less they should be angry at him. Yes - in Tim's universe, they should be angry at god for causing the person to be horrible (cont.)

— Tony

As you said, "...the more a person is inclined to do an evil or good deed the less accountable they are".

I agree. So what makes a person more or less inclined to do evil or good? Easy - God is the cause of people being more or less inclined to do evil or good. God specifically creates, programs, designs and causes us to do what we do. Ergo by your own standards, in Tim's universe it is unjust of god to hold us accountable.

— Tony

I was referring to the idea that we have free will in Edward's example because even if we grant for the sake of argument that we have free will (the ability to go one way or another) we have to take into account the observed fact that the stronger your motive the harder it is to resist it. So the more motivated you are to do a virtuous or wicked deed the less praiseworthy and blameworthy you are on YOUR PRINCIPALS. And the ideal state for maximum praise and blame is complete indifference to the action. But this is not common sense. Common sense says quite the opposite as Edwards pointed out. So why not just throw free will out completely as it is clearly contrary to moral responsibility, and instead say that we are to be praised and blamed for our motives and character regardless of how they came to be? This makes far more sense. I to be clear DO NOT believe in free will. We have as much free will as a pile of rocks in my view.

— Sam Burke

Sorry if I came across as overly harsh, I was just trying to emphasis my point, the capitalized letters do not indicate rage or impatience.

— Sam Burke

Sam

No apology necessary.

I think we may be talking at cross-purposes so some points for clarification.

This discussion has nothing to do with what I personally think about the issue of free will at all. What I personally think about free will is completely irrelevant to the points I am making.

I am simply trying to point out the incoherence and irrationality of divine determinism, and the absurdity and injustice of Tim's god holding us accountable and punishing us for things which he directly causes us to do.

— Tony

Thank you. I agree that the main point of the conversation is whether we can be held accountable without free will and if Divine Determinism is just or not. I just wanted to point out that free will logically speaking cannot exist. My main point using Edward's argument (although modified a bit) is to argue that we can be blamed under divine determinism despite the fact that God is making us do what we do. You have repeatedly stated that free will is the basis for praise and blame and I am trying to argue that it isn't. If free will is not the basis for praise and blame and motives and character are then Determinism is presumably compatible with moral responsibility. That is the main issue. I maintain that natural inability is not something you can be fairly praised or blamed for, but that moral inability is not an excuse. (And if you are completely unaware that a situation is going on that you should resolve then you are also excused.) (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

You stated that you agree that the more inclined someone is to do a good or bad deed the less accountable. To clarify this is referring to wicked or virtuous inclinations. This means that the more a person is concerned with helping a starving child the less praiseworthy they are for doing so. Do you actually think this? And the more indifferent they are to helping them the more praiseworthy they are for doing so. Ideally the person would be completely indifferent to doing so and then they would be absolutely praiseworthy if they did it. I don't know what this is but it certainly is not common sense. In common sense, if someone is indifferent to helping a starving child when it is easy for him to do so, then he is a vile person unworthy of any praise. The more he is inclined to help the child the more praiseworthy. Similarly if someone is indifferent to the idea of stabbing a baby for fun then they are a repulsive person worthy of being condemned by anyone who is aware of this fact.

— Sam Burke

Sam

To reiterate - my own views on free will are irrelevant to the point I'm making.

Let me illustrate.

Let's say for the sake of argument, that I agree with you and that motive and character are the basis for moral responsibility. On that basis, let me ask you a question.

In a deterministic universe (i.e. Tim's universe) where do our motives and character come from? If I have, for example, a wicked character and wicked inclinations, who or what caused me to have a wicked character and wicked inclinations?

— Tony

Your views on free will existing may be irrelevant, but your views on the relationship between free will and moral responsibility are very relevant. To answer your question, God at least ultimately caused your character in his view.

— Sam Burke

Exactly.

Therefore the moral responsibility for my wickedness lies with god, not with me.

— Tony

In this hypothetical example the wicked person did not cause him/herself to be wicked, God did. But the wicked person is evil and acts evil as a result of these wicked tendencies and therefore deserves to be punished. If God caused someone to be evil out of a wicked motive then he would be evil, but this assumes that God does not have an morally sufficient reason to make the person wicked. If God makes someone wicked for a good reason for example to demonstrate his justice, then he is not evil for making them that way. Although he is responsible in the sense that he caused it to happen. Just as the wicked person is responsible for what he does in the sense that he caused it to happen. Hopefully this makes sense.

— Sam Burke

No, frankly it makes no sense to hold someone responsible (i.e accountable) for that for which they are not responsible (i.e. did not cause, bring about, create, ordain or determine). God's "motives' in creating the wicked are irrelevant as those who are not responsible for their wickedness are still being punished for it.

— Tony

They brought about the bad deeds they did. That is what I am saying they are accountable for. And are being punished for. They did it out of evil motives. As shown above free will is not the basis for moral responsibility. Motive/character is. Why does it matter that the motives/character ultimately came from beyond their control? You have stated that you for the sake of argument agree that motive and character are the basis for moral responsibility. Ok then. I used to think the way you do, but since I have realized that free will is not the basis for moral responsibility (which is what we disagree) If free will is not the basis for moral responsibility then why does it matter what causes us to have a certain character and motives?

— Sam Burke

No, they most assuredly did not. *GOD* brought about the bad deeds they did, and you have to explain why and how it makes sense to hold a person responsible for, and moreover punish her for, bad deeds that were wholly and entirely caused by someone else. So far you haven't done that. Until you do, I don't really know what more I can say.

— Tony

Tony, my entire point is that free will is not the basis for moral responsibility and that character and motive is. If this is true then why does it matter that someone else caused it? Because they didn't freely choose to do it? A person deserves to be praised or blamed for what they do as a result of their character/motives. As everyone is well aware at the very least a great deal of a person's character is determined by their environment. People often say that a child's character is a testimony to way his/her parents raised them. Or they blame the parents for how they turned out, yet this doesn't stop them from blaming/praising the child. We simply disagree on the basis for moral responsibility.

— Sam Burke

Why does it matter that someone else caused it?

Well, there's the small matter of eternal punishment in hell...

— Tony

You are making the assumption that we must be ultimately responsible (Aka:have free will) for our actions to deserve to be punished or rewarded. Yet I have repeatedly demonstrated that this is not the case and you have not provided a single refutation of my arguments that the proper basis for responsibility cannot be free will because of the absurd implications that follow from it. If I am correct then the question of where the motives and characters came from this is the central issue here. I dispute that there is not a difference between moral inability and natural inability.

— Sam Burke

Well if you don't get the essential absurdity of god punishing humans for being and doing precisely what he (and he alone) causes them to be and do, as if it's some sort of surprise to him, then I can't help you I'm afraid.

— Tony

It's not a surprise anymore then when an author causes a character to do an evil action in a book. The author knows what will happen and determines it yet can still can feel a sense of justice when the wicked character is vanquished. And I pointed this out to you multiple comments ago with no rebuttal from you. You are the only person who I have told this to who has not conceded the point, and that includes people who have continued to believe in free will who nevertheless have admitted that free will is not the basis for moral responsibility. I understand your objection perfectly. I left Christianity because I learned that the Bible teaches Calvinism. (Among other reasons, though this was the final straw.) (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

I watched a video by Megan Phelps-Roper, a former member of the Westboro Baptist Church, (the hate group that goes around protesting at funerals including soldiers funerals) which I had a sort of horrified fascination with which resulted in me watching the video out of curiosity. It was entitled "Phelps on God's will and why she is no longer a Christian." It was about Romans 9:11-23 and as she said your basic argument very simply: "So he makes you do it and then he punishes you for it." ( "he" is referring to God.) Once I made sure that was what Romans 9 said, I viewed this as horribly unfair, because I assumed that free will is the basis of moral responsibility. Thanks to Jonathan Edwards I no longer believe this and although I don't think we have free will anymore, I nevertheless believe in moral responsibility.

— Sam Burke

I specifically ignored your "authors cause characters to do evil" point because it's absurd.

When an author "causes" a character to sin, no-one actually sins and no-one suffers because they're figments of the imagination and words on a page. You do get that...right?

On the other hand, Tim's god allegedly creates living, conscious beings whose unalterable destiny is eternal torture in hell.

Tim's response to this objection is that it's "special pleading".

You know that special pleading is a fallacious attempt to cite something as an exception to a rule or principle without justifying the exception.

My objection justifies the exception. Ergo it's not special pleading.

— Tony

Tony, please actually read my comments before responding. I specifically stated in my first comment about authors and characters that they are imaginary. I am well aware that there is a difference between someone making an object that doesn't suffer (or a imaginary character who doesn't suffer) and a conscious being do something that results in their being punished. The point I was trying to make is that you don't need to be surprised about a wrong action to be angry and you can even want it to happen (in a way) and yet still be angry. I am not using the analogy the fallacious way Tim is. Well I agree that the Creator has the right to do as he pleases with his creation, I agree that Timothy's point is not logical.

— Sam Burke

Apologies if I haven't addressed your point fully. I'm having difficulty responding to it because it is, however you put it, absurd.

Frankly, the idea that an author would somehow rejoice about a wicked character being vanquished is as bizarre as an author being angry at a wicked character that prevailed.

You said "...you don't need to be surprised about a wrong action to be angry". Not my point. It's incoherent and absurd to be angry about something that you knew was going to happen and were the sole and entire cause of happening.

"...you can even want it to happen...and still be angry". Again, this is absurd. If you want something to happen, and you cause it to happen, what precisely are you angry about? That things turned out exactly as you wanted them to?

You said "...the Creator has the right to do as he pleases with his creations".

Very nice for him I'm sure, but that just makes Tim's god the most egregious example of "might makes right"

— Tony

Even if I agree that motive and character are the basis for moral responsibility, the primary issue (which you've avoided addressing thus far) is that of culpability.

I've been thinking of how better to explain my contention.

P1. A is culpable for X to the extent that A causes X.
P2. In Tim's universe god causes, and is the sole cause of, everything.
C1. God is culpable for everything.

Ergo it is unjust of god to blame and punish man for that for which god, and god alone, is culpable.

— Tony

Premise 2 is false. God caused you to do that but you caused that to happen similar to how I might cause a domino to fall and it might cause another domino to fall. You must establish one thing, that because God is culpable the character is not culpable. That is what you need to establish without saying that free will is the basis for moral responsibility and you simply cannot do it. If Motive and Character is the basis for moral responsibility, NOT your supposed self generation of your actions, thoughts, character, motives, etc then how is it relevant to the persons culpability that it was ultimately caused by other factors beyond you control?

— Sam Burke

I am going to have to figure out how to respond to the author issue, I am looking for a clear way to respond. You responded that the creator has the right to do as he pleases is "might makes right." Not at all. If you make something you own it, if you own something you get to do what you want with it, simple.

— Sam Burke

Premise 2 is false? Well I never. Where could I have got the idea that it was true?

Maybe it was Tim when he wrote "...god is the ultimate cause of everything that occurs" and "...god causes whatever happens" and "...the biblical god is in complete control of everything" and "The idea of a god who causes people to exist, which people then in turn cause events to occur, and said events are not in any way caused by the aforementioned god, is completely incoherent"

Maybe I got the idea from other Calvinists who wrote similar things, such as...

Calvin himself, who wrote "Men do nothing save at the secret instigation of god" and "...every event comes from his intended will. Nothing happens by chance" and "...wills of men are so governed as to move exactly in the course which he has destined" and "The will of god is the chief and principal cause of all things" (cont.)

— Tony

Maybe I got the idea from Vincent Cheung who wrote "God controls everything that is and everything that happens. There is not one thing that happens that he has not actively decreed" and "God actively decrees everything and that nothing can happen apart from his will and his power, it makes no sense to say that he merely permits something - nothing happens by god's mere permission".

Or J.I. Packer who wrote "God...orders and controls all things, human actions among them".

Or Edwin Palmer who wrote "All things that happen in all the world and in all history-whether inorganic matter, vegetation, animal, man or angels (both good and evil ones)-come to pass because god ordained them" and "...god decides and causes all things to happen that do happen. He is not sitting on the side-lines wondering and perhaps fearing what is going to happen next". (cont.)

— Tony

Or maybe it was Gordon Clark who wrote "I wish very frankly and pointedly to assert that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it was the will of god that he should do it..." and "Let it be unequivocally said that this view certainly makes god the cause of sin..." and "God is the ultimate cause of everything. There is absolutely nothing independent of him".

In Tim's universe, premise 2 is absolutely true my friend.

— Tony

We are talking about Timothy here not the others. For Vincent Cheung for example premise 2 would be correct as he believes in Occasionalism. If Timothy subscribes to that view then you have successfully established premise 2. I do not know if he does or not and I leave it to you to establish that he does.

— Sam Burke

I don't think it's too much of a stretch to conclude that Tim would agree with those eminent Calvinists, when he says things like "...god is in complete control of everything" and "God works all things after the counsel of his will" and "He (god) has clearly caused everything that has ever come to pass" and "God has intentionally caused everything that happens" and "Justifiable reason for anything...can only exist if god is the uncaused first cause behind everything that happens" and "[humans are] the means by which something is done or caused".

He also wrote "...in total control of everything...is...a good description of god" and "god has caused everything that ever happened, intending the exact results as they occurred, and nothing else could have occurred except that which god intended and knew would occur".

If I've misrepresented Tim's views, he's free (pun intended) to correct me.

— Tony

P2. In Tim's universe god causes, and is the sole cause of, everything.

This is false.

P1. A is culpable for X to the extent that A causes X.

I don't agree. It may be true in Tony's world, but to impute it to mine is a strawman.

Most importantly, in absolutely none of Tony's plethora of quotes from me is Tony's P2 fully established. He established this portion of it, yes:

P2a. In Tim's universe god causes everything.

P2a is true, as Tony has clearly demonstrated with his utterly unnecessary plethora of quotes from me. But it is nowhere near the same thing as P2.

C1. God is culpable for everything.

This is true, as long as "culpable" merely means "responsible" and not "at fault." But this is not the same as the following:

C2. God alone is culpable and we are not.

C2 is what Tony keeps asserting is my view, and his only basis for this claim is that I plainly hold to P2a. But P2a does not establish C2, no matter how many times Tony quotes me affirming it.

Thanks Sam.

— Timothy McCabe

Thanks Timothy for clarifying your position. I agree that Tony did not establish the key part that God is the only cause. Tony, you literally quoted him as saying that: "[humans are] the means by which something is done or caused". Exactly!! That is my point. He caused them to do X (via there character/motives) but they still caused X to happen, ergo they are culpable for it to the extent that it was a result of their motives/character.

— Sam Burke

Tony to once again point out what follows from free will being the basis for moral responsibility I will quote Jonathan Edwards as it is his birthday today (October 5) so I see it as fit to quote him today: "Every prepossessing fixed bias on the mind brings a degree of moral inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biased and prepossessed, so much hindrance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of virtue and vice, then so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of inclination; whether covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else; so much the more excusable persons are; so much the less have their evil acts of this kind, the nature of vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent dispositions and inclinations they have, so much are they the less virtuous." (Continued.)

— Sam Burke

To illustrate another example: If free will is the basis for moral responsibility, the more a person is inclined by his character to murdering a child the less the child's parents should be angry at the murderer or blame him. And the more a person is inclined by their character to benevolently and selflessly help starving children even at high cost to themself the less they deserve to be praised. I highly doubt that you in your daily life act as if this is the case. If someone murdered your children (if you have any) in cold blood while they were conscious and terrified I highly doubt that the more their character inclined them to do this the less you would be inclined to blame them. No, people who do such things should be put in jail for life or executed, the more inclined to do so the more guilty. And if someone saved them at high cost to themself the more inclined they were to do so the more you would want to thank and praise and perhaps reward them, correct?

— Sam Burke

If God condemned people to Hell because of free will, yet He wanted to save them, would that mean He isn't capable of saving them?

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